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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
FEDERAL REGULATION OF RADIO COMMUNICATION:
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
P RIOR to 1934, telephone and telegraph communications were
regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and radio
communications were under the control of the Federal Radio Com-
mission. Because of the increasing importance of these fields and
the difficulty of obtaining uniform regulations, Congress passed
the Communications Act of 1934, placing all communications
under one agency.' The Act abolished the Federal Radio Commis-
sion and created the Federal Communications Commission,2 which
was given control over telephone, telegraph, and radio communica-
tions.
The purpose of the Act, generally, was to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce in communications so as to give all the people
in the United States an efficient communications service with ade-
quate facilities at reasonable rates.' The Federal Communications
Commission was given jurisdiction over and, within the terms of
the law, power to regulate interstate and foreign communications
by wire and radio.' All communications by wire and radio which
originate or are received in the United States and its territories
are under the control of the Federal Communications Commission.5
The Commission has the power to supervise rates, license radio
stations, and to establish and enforce rules and regulations that
will aid in the fulfillment of the purposes of the act.6 In making
such rules, the Commission must conform to the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.' Subject to this limitation, it has wide dis-
1 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 151 et seq.
2 Seven Commissioners, appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate for a term of seven years, compose the Commission. The terms
are staggered. No Commissioner may be connected in any way with any business en-
gaged in buying or selling communications apparatus, and no more than four of the
seven may be of the same political party.
s47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 151.
4 Sablowsky v. U. S., 101 F. 2d 183 (3rd Cir. 1938).
'47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 152.
6 F. C. C. ANNUAL REPORT (1950) 13.
7 5 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1001 et seq.
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cretion in determining public and procedural policy, and in mak-
ing appropriate rules.' The Commission has no right of censor-
ship except as to indecent language.9 A rule promulgated pursuant
to the statutory authority has the force and effect of federal law.'0
Hearings before the Commission may be either formal or infor-
mal. Informal hearings may be held on motion of the Commission
or on petition by any person with sufficient interest." All interested
parties must be given reasonable notice of formal hearings. The
notice must contain the time and place of the hearing, the nature
of the hearing, a statement of the law and facts involved, and the
authority under which the hearing is to be held.'"
The Commission, or the presiding officer assigned by the Com-
mission to the particular case, may hold a pre-hearing conference
for simplifying issues, amending the pleadings, making admis-
sions, determining the procedure to be followed at the hearing and
considering offers of settlement. 8
The presiding officer, appointed by the Commission,14 may be
a hearing examiner or one or more Commissioners." The presid-
ing officer is subject to challenge. If he denies a motion for dis-
qualification, an exception may be taken to the ruling, and the
question will be certified to the Commission for its determination. 6
The presiding officer receives evidence and declares the hearing
closed when all the evidence is taken. 7 Within twenty days there-
after each party is required to file with the presiding officer pro-
posed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Failure to do so
8 Ward v. F. C. C., 108 F. 2d 486 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
9 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 326.
10 Regents of N. M. A. & M. College v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F. 2d
900 (10th Cir. 1947).
1147 C. F. R. § 1.801 (1949 ed.).
12 Id. § 1.803.
1I Id. § 1.814.
141d. § 1.843(a).
15 5 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1006(a).
1647 C. F. R. § 1.843(b) (1949 ed.).
17 Id. § 1.846.
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constitutes waiver of the right to participate further in the pre-
ceeding.'8
After considering the proposed findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law, the presiding officer prepares and files with the Com-
mission his initial or recommended decision. The decision of the
presiding officer must contain findings of facts and conclusions of
law on all material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on
the record, and the appropriate rule, sanction or relief for the
case."9 If the presiding officer submits only a recommended deci-
sion, the Commission itself will issue an initial decision.
Exceptions to the initial decision must be filed with the Commis-
sion within twenty days after public notice thereof is given.2" A
final decision will be rendered by the Commission after considera-
tion of exceptions, and the final decision contains rulings on all
material and relevant exceptions.2
An important procedural feature of the Federal Communications
Commission is that a petition for rehearing must be filed with the
Commission within twenty days after the final decision is ren-
dered, as a condition precedent to judicial review. It is within the
discretion of the Commission to grant a rehearing,22 but the peti-
tion must be submitted and ruled upon before the party aggrieved
can appeal to the courts.2"
Two methods of judicial review of orders of the Commission are
provided by the Act: review in federal district courts or in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. An
administrative order must have been rendered before resort is had
to the courts, 24 and all administrative remedies must have been
exhausted before appeal.25 The administrative remedies must be
18 Id. § 1.849.
19 Id. § 1.851.
20 Id. § 1.854.
21 Id. § 1.856.
22 Id. § 1.892.
23 Red River Broadcasting Co.'v. F. C. C., 98 F. 2d 282 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
24 Black River Broadcasting Co. v. McNinch, 101 F. 2d 235 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
25 Southland Industries v. F. C. C., 99 F 2d 117 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
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pursued to their appropriate conclusion: it is not sufficient that they
are merely instituted."6
In all proceedings, other than those involving an application for
a construction permit, station license, or renewal or modification
of a station license, the review is the same as that provided for re-
view of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 7 Suit may
be brought in the appropriate federal district court to set aside,
enjoin, annul or enforce the order of the Commission." An injunc-
tion against enforcement of the order may be issued by a three-
judge district court.2 9 The jurisdiction of the federal district court
is exclusive, and state courts have no jurisdiction to set aside the
order of the Commission. 0 Only questions affecting constitutional
power, statutory authority and basic prerequisites of proof can be
raised, and if these are satisfied, the orders are uncontestableS
The courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the Com-
mission, nor set aside the order unless it is made without substan-
tial evidence to support it, involves errors of law, or is so mani-
festly arbitrary and unreasonable as to transcend the powers of
the Commission.32
Exclusive jurisdiction is given to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in proceedings on an applica-
tion for a construction permit, station license, or renewal or modi-
fication of a station license." Review is limited in this court as in
the case of other orders reviewed in the district courts. The re-
view is limited to questions of law, and findings of fact are held to
be conclusive unless clearly arbitrary or capricious, 34 or not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 5
26 Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Co. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947).
27 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 402.
28 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 2322.
29 Id. § 2325.
30 St. Louis Connecting Ry. Co. v. Blumberg, 325 Il1. 387, 156 N. E. 298 (1927).
31 Waterway Transportation Co. v. U. S., 83 F. Supp. 588 (E. D. Mo. 1949).
32 Carolina Scenic Coach Lines v. U. S., 56 F. Supp. 801 (W. D. N. C. 1944), aff'd,,
323 U. S. 678 (1944).
33 Black River Broadcasting Co. v. McNinch, 101 F. 2d 235 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
84 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 402.
35 Courier Post Publishing Co. v. F. C. C., 104 F. 2d 213 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
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Important aspects of procedure before the Federal Comunica-
tions Commission have been called in question before the courts
in recent cases. Among them are admissibility of evidence, the
right to oral argument, the necessity of administrative fact findings,
and the subpoena power of the Commission.
Admissibility of Evidence. Under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act any oral or documentary evidence may be received
by an administrative agency other than irrelevant, immaterial or
unduly repetitious evidence; provided, however, that no sanction
may be imposed or rule or order issued except as supported and
in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.36
Supplementing the general language of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, the Federal Communications Commission has provided
that the ordinary rules of evidence for non-jury civil cases in fed-
eral courts shall prevail in hearings before the Commission, except
where justice will be "better served" by relaxing the same. 7 The
question has arisen whether, under these liberal provisions, de-
cisions of the Commission may be vacated as having been based
upon incompetent evidence.
The case of Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C."8 involved in-
,competent evidence. In that case an applicant for a radio station
was permitted to testify before the presiding officer as to conver-
sations he had had with other parties who had stated to him that
El Paso needed another radio station. On review, the court held
that such testimony was hearsay and incompetent. It was contended
that the applicant was an expert and could testify as such concern-
ing the need for additional radio facilities. The court held that
the applicant had not been properly qualified as an expert. The
,court said:
"... While the Commission under familiar principles is not, as an
administrative body, limited by the strict rules as to the admissibility
of evidence which prevail in courts, nevertheless, '...the more liberal
36 5 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1001 et seq.
37 47 C. F. R. § 1.871 (1949 ed.).
38 96 F. 2d 564 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
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the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative the obliga.
tion to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are
asserted or defended .... , 7939
The court set aside the order of the Commission granting the
application on the ground that the Commission did not make proper
fact findings. The court declined to decide whether there was suf-
ficient competent evidence to support the order of the Commission
until adequate findings of fact were made.
Although incompetent evidence will not support an order of the
Commission, receiving incompetent evidence does not of itself
constitute such error as will warrant the court's setting aside the
order. Common law exclusionary rules of evidence are not based
on constitutional interdiction, and are not applicable to admin-
istrative proceedings, unless observance of them is required by
statute. While the agency should exclude irrelevant, immaterial
or unduly repetitious evidence, the receipt of such evidence, even
hearsay, over objection, is not grounds for vacating the order of
the agency.40
Right to Argument. In the recent case of F. C. C. v. WIJR, The
Goodwill Station,4 the Supreme Court of the United States con-
sidered at length the problem of when a party is entitled to oral
argument before the Commission. The Coastal Broadcasting Com-
pany applied for and was granted a permit to build a radio sta-
tion. The applicable statute' 2 requires that the holder of an out-
standing license be given notice of the application for a station
on the same frequency and an opportunity to show cause why the
application for the license should not be issued. Such notice was
not given to WJR, but after the application had been passed upon
by the Commission, WJR filed a petition for consideration and re-
hearing. The Commission denied the petition without giving WJR
opportunity for oral argument. The United States Court of Appeals
39 Id. at 566.
40 Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949).
41337 U. S. 265 (1949).
42 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 312b.
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ruled that procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution requires an opportunity for oral argument to be
given on all questions of law raised before a judicial or quasi.
judicial tribunal, except questions of law involved in interlocutory
orders. This ruling was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. Such a decision, said the Court, would require oral argu-
ment on every legal question whether substantial or insubstantial,
and the Court held that due process under the Fifth Amendment
has not cast so rigid a rule.
".... [T]he right of oral argument as a matter of procedural due
process varies from case to case in accordance with differing circum-
stances.... Certainly the Constitution does not require oral argument
in all cases where only insubstantial or frivolous questions of law, or
indeed even substantial ones, are raised ....
"It follows also that we should not undertake in this case to generalize
more broadly than the particular circumstances require upon when and
under what circumstances procedural due process may require oral
argument.... It is rather one for case-to-case determination, through
which alone account may be taken of differences in the particular inter-
ests affected, circumstances involved, and procedures prescribed by
Congress for dealing with them."4'
Section 4j of the Federal Communications Act" allows the Com-
mission to conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best con-
duce to proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice. This
and Section 312b45 left to the reasonable discretion of the Com-
mission when it would permit oral argument. The Act does not ex-
pressly require it, and there was no denial of due process in re-
fusing oral argument. This decision may constitute a departure
from the rule of Londoner v. Denver,46 in which the Court stated
that a "hearing in its very essence demands that he who is en-
titled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argu-
4.3 337 U. S. at 276, 277.
44 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 154j.
4B 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 312b.
46210 U. S. 373, 386 (1908).
[Vol. 5
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ment however brief" and in which the failure of a board of equal-
ization to accord a hearing with oral argument rendered the de-
cision void.
In its decision in the WIR case the court seemed not to regard
as of particular importance the very real difference between oral
argument and written argument. Written argument, submitted with
points and authorities, may not be given careful consideration by
the hearing officer or the agency. But, in making an oral argument,
the party is at least assured that his points have been explained and
heard, and he has the further opportunity of answering questions
and explaining matters which may not have been fully understood.
The power of persuasion is more effective in oral than in written
form.47
Necessity of Fact Findings. When an order is entered denying an
application for a radio station permit, the Commission is required
to file a full statement of facts and the grounds for its decision.4"
The party appealing must state expressly wherein the decision is
wrong, and a statement of facts found is necessary to enable him
to do so. Therefore, the Commission is under a duty to make such
findings.49 In the case of Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C.5" the
court held that this requirement is a means to assure that the case
is decided according to the law and evidence. It is not a mere
technicality. If there are no findings of fact, the court cannot de-
cide whether the decision follows as a matter of law from the
facts, or is supported by substantial evidence. The court will not
consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the de-
cision unless there are adequate findings of fact.51 In the Saginaw
Broadcasting Co. case, the court held that findings in broad terms
of public convenience, interest or necessity are not sufficient. The
findings must include basic facts from which the ultimate facts
47 Tri-State Broadcasting Co. (Station KSTM) v. F. C. C., 107 F. 2d 956 (D. C.
Cir. 1939).
- 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 402(c).
49 Missouri Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 94 F. 2d 623 (D. C. Cir. 1937).
50 96 F. 2d 554 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
51 Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 96 F. 2d 564 (D. C. Cir. 1938).
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are inferred. The court will not search the record for the facts.
In the absence of findings on essential basic facts, the order can-
not be sustained.
Scope of Subpoena Power of the Commission. Can the Com-
munications Commission subpoena witnesses to testify at an in-
quiry that is directed solely at obtaining information which will
aid in the determination of future rules and public policy? The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia answered this ques-
tion in Stahiman v. F. C. C.52 The Commission was conducting an
inquiry, on its own motion, to determine what statement of policy
or rules, if any, it should issue concerning applications for high
frequency (FM) broadcasting stations by applicants associated
with publication of newspapers. The appellant was subpoenaed to
appear at the hearing in Washington, D. C. He refused to appear
on the ground that the hearing was not authorized by the Act. A
district court order was issued commanding him to appear. The
court of appeals affirmed this order. Section 403 of the Act 8 gives
full power to the Commission, with or without complaint, to insti-
tute an inquiry concerning questions arising under the provisions
of the Act or relating to its enforcement. The court concluded that
this included authority to obtain the information necessary to dis-
charge its proper functions, including an investigation directed at
the prevention or disclosure of practices contrary to public policy.
The power to grant licenses and to make rules and regulations nec-
essary to the carrying out of the provisions of the Act implies the
grant of all means necessary or appropriate to the discharge of
the power expressly granted. The information sought in the Stahl-
man case pertained to subjects within the power of the Commis-
sion, and the order was upheld, subject however, to the following
warning:
"... [W]e do not mean to hold or to suggest that the Commission
is authorized to require appellant or other witnesses whom it may
52 126 F. 2d 124 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
53 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 403.
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